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A central question in economics is how to 
ensure that employees do not shirk their work-
place responsibilities. Most of the research on 
this question focuses on economic governance 
schemes that provide incentives to induce 
employees to act in the interests of their employ-
ers (Canice Prendergast 1999). Some studies 
examine arrangements to induce self-selection 
by potential employees having heterogeneous 
unobserved human capital. An alternative to 
self-selection, much less studied by econo-
mists (for an exception, see Casey Ichniowski, 
Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi 1997), 
is applicant screening, where the employer 
attempts to identify which applicants have the 
desirable attributes. An advantage of the screen-
ing approach versus self-selection is that it does 
not require the applicant to even be aware of 
possessing relevant attributes.
Virtually all employers use some level of 
applicant screening. It is a fundamental part 
of the human resources function in most firms. 
Although different kinds of jobs may require 
different attributes, arguably the most funda-
mental attribute and the one that cuts across vir-
tually all jobs can be described as work ethic, 
what we might think of as the ability to work 
hard independent of monitoring by employers 
or of rewards. The field of personnel psychology 
has spent a great deal of time examining attri-
butes of individuals associated with work ethic, 
and one of the most important is the personality 
construct known as “conscientiousness,” which 
has been found to be a reliable and consistent 
dimension of personality that relates strongly 
to job performance across types of jobs (Frank 
Schmidt and John Hunter 1998).
In this paper, we study the screening of job can-
didates to find workers with a stronger work ethic 
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and examine the effects on  performance-related 
outcomes, using data from a national sample 
of US employers. We find that employers who 
screen applicants more intensively for factors 
that should predict work ethic are able to use 
less expensive monitoring of employees. They 
are also able to make greater use of teamwork, 
an approach to organizing work that uses less 
supervision and gives employees greater auton-
omy, which otherwise creates greater opportu-
nity for shirking. This screening is associated 
with higher employee productivity, lower invol-
untary turnover rates, and higher wages via 
rent-sharing. Screening for other attributes, in 
contrast, such as more traditional human capital 
measures, does not produce these results.
This paper contributes to research on the 
synergies among work and human resource 
practices by highlighting the importance of 
screening in affecting a firm’s workplace prac-
tices and performance-related outcomes, which 
has not yet been systematically analyzed in 
the literature. Our results are also consistent 
with basic gift-exchange patterns in that work-
ers make extra effort and get rewarded with 
higher wages (George Akerlof 1982). And a new 
insight from our paper, especially in the light of 
recent negative evidence from field experiments (Uri Gneezy and John List 2006), is that screen-
ing for more conscientious employees may be 
crucial for the gift-exchange relationship to be 
mutually beneficial and sustainable.
I.  Hypotheses
Several hypotheses can be generated from a 
theoretical model that includes costly screening 
and monitoring in a principal-agent framework 
with workers differing in work ethic, where a 
worker with a stronger work ethic requires less 
monitoring and lower extrinsic rewards to elicit 
effort. Work ethic is not publicly observable but 
can be detected by a screening technique.
The first hypothesis is that there should be 
some substitution between the use of screening 
for work ethic and monitoring, because greater 
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use of screening can lead to a work force that 
is less likely to shirk and therefore requires less 
monitoring to achieve a given level of perfor-
mance. We might also expect the monitoring/
screening decision to be related to the produc-
tion function and the choice of work systems. 
For example, employers with teamwork-based 
systems and those that rely on “empowered” 
employees (i.e., where employees have greater 
discretion to act) make monitoring by supervi-
sors more difficult and should therefore make 
greater investments in screening. That is, we 
expect to find that screening for work ethic and 
teamwork are complementary practices, and 
this is our second hypothesis.
The following result from the model may 
seem counterintuitive: Employers should pay 
employees with a stronger work ethic more 
despite the fact that lower extrinsic incentives 
are needed to motivate them. The usual under-
standing is that employers pay such workers less 
and hence get higher profits; this may arise in 
a typical principal-agent model when competi-
tion among employers for talent is ignored, but 
it is unlikely to be an equilibrium result, because 
competition would bid up the wages for such 
employees in equilibrium. In other words, work-
ers with better work ethics contribute value by 
reducing the need for monitoring, saving money 
for employers; and in order to retain these con-
scientious workers, employers may be motivated 
to pay them higher wages as rent-sharing. We 
might therefore expect a positive relationship 
between screening for work ethic and employee 
compensation, which is the third hypothesis. 
Such a compensation package with less moni-
toring and higher pay that is offered to workers 
with stronger work ethics, however, is even more 
attractive to weaker agents, which renders self-
selection infeasible, and thus principals have to 
rely on careful applicant screening to separate 
the conscientious agents from the selfish ones, 
albeit imperfectly.
The fourth prediction of the model is that 
more selective screening leads to higher pro-
ductivity, because the employee hired by a more 
selective employer has a higher probability of 
being a conscientious worker. This combined 
with the first result that those principals who 
screen more monitor less implies that the invol-
untary turnover rates of employees are lower 
when the screening selectivity is higher, which 
is the fifth hypothesis.
Another result of the model shows that firm 
profits may not strictly increase in individual 
screening selectivity, because the higher sur-
plus associated with more selective screening is 
allocated to employees in the format of higher 
wages, which are essentially a part of the rent 
generated by agent work ethic. This may shed 
light on the puzzling empirical results that firms 
adopting high performance work practices 
do not necessarily earn higher profits while 
wages are higher (Sandra Black and Lisa Lynch 
2004; Peter Cappelli and David Neumark 2001; 
Richard Freeman and Morris Kleiner 2000). 
To be sure, however, the model predicts that 
all employers may obtain higher profits when 
screening is less costly or when the average 
work ethic is higher, and so collectively prin-
cipals do benefit from more selective screening 
for work ethic.
II.  Data Description
The five hypotheses described above are 
tested using data from the 1997 National 
Employer Survey (NES97), a nationally repre-
sentative sample of private establishments with 
more than 20 employees. Our analysis focuses 
exclusively on production or frontline employees 
in all industries. The sampling weights are taken 
into consideration in all the estimation results, 
and correlations of random errors among firms 
within the same industry are allowed.
We use a variety of measures to capture 
efforts to screen applicants for work ethic. 
Perhaps the most common measure of how 
extensively an employer screens applicants is 
the number of candidates interviewed for each 
job opening, which is labeled candidates#, a 
measure that reflects screening for attributes of 
any kind, not just work ethic. The NES97 also 
asks a series of more specific questions about 
selection. The stem of the question asks the man-
ager: “After you have established your applicant 
pool and obtained information about potential 
employee, what characteristics or attributes are 
most critical in making your hiring decision?” 
The importance scale ranges from 1 to 5, indi-
cating respectively “no value,” “some value,” 
“important,” “very important,” and “essential.” 
Respondents use this scale to assess 12 general 
attributes about applicants, one of which is an 
applicant’s attitude toward work. This variable 
seems specifically oriented toward the goal of 
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identifying intrinsic work ethic. It is also the 
highest ranked item. To be clear, the variable 
measures the importance the employer gives to 
work ethic in assessing candidates, rather than 
the mechanisms used to do such screening, 
which we do not observe directly. Because most 
firms report either 4 or 5 for the importance of 
work attitude in hiring decision, a binary ver-
sion (= 1 if reporting 5) of this variable, labeled 
Work Attitude Screening, is used as the measure 
of screening selectivity for work ethic.
The remaining 11 screening criteria can 
be easily divided into two groups, whose 
average levels of importance are labeled 
Work Experience Screening and Academic 
Performance Screening, respectively. These 
three selectivity variables are positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with each other, and firms 
do vary a lot in the scores they assign to them.
We measure the extent of employer moni-
toring of employees with a standard measure, 
Employee-Supervisor Ratio. It is the aver-
age number of employees that report to each 
front-line supervisor, where higher ratios mean 
lower monitoring intensity. The percentage of 
production employees involved in self-man-
aged teams, denoted by teamwork, captures 
a common work system that involves low lev-
els of monitoring, where employees manage 
themselves.
In terms of outcome measures, wages are 
measured by the log of the average annual pay 
of production employees. A simple measure of 
employee productivity is Relative Productivity, 
which equals one if the employer considers its 
employees’ productivity to be higher than its 
major competitors and zero if not. About 50 
percent of firms in the sample consider their 
employees relatively more productive, and so 
it seems to be quite reliable. It is also a com-
monly used measure of productivity across 
industries in related literature (e.g., Alex Bryson 
and Freeman 2008). The variable involuntary 
turnover equals the percentage of permanent 
workforce in the firm that left involuntarily (e.g., 
fired or laid off) in the past year.
The fact that our data are cross-sectional 
limits the ability to make causal arguments, 
but as noted above, most hypotheses are asso-
ciative rather than causal. Many questions in 
the NES97 survey are asked only for frontline 
production employees, which greatly narrows 
the range of possible jobs we can examine, but 
that  limitation also helps control for  exogenous 
sources of variation. Detailed industry and size 
dummies are also used to control for poten-
tial variations in the important aspects of pro-
duction functions and in the costs or ability 
to screen and monitor employees (e.g., scale 
economies). Other potentially relevant factors 
controlled include standard human capital mea-
sures—the average years of schooling for pro-
duction employees, their weekly working hours, 
the usage of computers on the job by supervisors 
and employees, the length of time for a new hire 
to reach job proficiency, ratios of women and 
minorities among permanent employees, and 
union strength. These variables are used as con-
trols to account for the remaining elements in 
the model that may influence a firm’s monitor-
ing and screening choices as well as wage levels, 
employee productivity and turnover rates. Due 
to missing values, the sample sizes vary across 
regression models.
III.  Estimation Results
Table 1 summarizes our main estimation 
results, which are robust to alternative speci-
fications (not reported). Column 1 shows the 
relationship between Employee-Supervisor 
Ratio and screening selectivity for work ethic. 
Firms that screen more for work ethic should 
hire better agents who need less monitoring 
to make the required effort. Because a higher 
employee-supervisor ratio implies a lower moni-
toring intensity, the coefficient of Work Attitude 
Screening should be positive in the regression, 
and this is indeed the case. It remains posi-
tive and significant even when controlling for 
candidates#, the measure of overall screen-
ing selectivity, and the other two screening 
variables, Work Experience Screening and 
Academic Performance Screening, all of which, 
in contrast, have insignificant coefficients. The 
estimates suggest that treating work attitude as 
essential in hiring employees (as opposed to 
anything less than essential) enables a typical 
frontline manager to supervise about 2 more 
employees on average, which is equivalent to the 
effect of interviewing about 14 more job candi-
dates for each production job opening (over 2.5 
standard deviations of candidates#). This sug-
gests that the tradeoff between the intensities of 
screening for work ethic and monitoring can be 
quite substantial.
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When teamwork is the dependent variable in 
column 2, the results are similar: the coefficient 
of Work Attitude Screening is again positive and 
significant, while those of the other screening 
variables are still insignificant. These estimates 
suggest that treating work attitude as essential 
in hiring employees is associated with an aver-
age increase of 5.84 percentage of employees 
involved in teamwork, which is about 19 per-
centage of a standard deviation of teamwork. 
The evidence indicates a strong synergy between 
screening employees for work ethic and the use 
of low-monitoring work practices that make use 
of such behavior. More generally, the results are 
consistent with the notion that there is a trade-
off between management approaches that rely 
on conscientious workers and empowered work-
ing arrangements as compared to those that rely 
on high levels of monitoring.
The relationship between log wages and 
screening selectivity is tested in column 3, 
where the number of employee benefits contrib-
uted by the firm is also included as a control. 
Because more selective principals offer higher 
wages to their agents in order to retain them, we 
predict a positive coefficient for screening selec-
tivity for work ethic, which is indeed the case. In 
contrast, the coefficient of candidates#, though 
positive, is insignificant as before, while those 
of the other two screening variables are signifi-
cant but with different signs; the negative sign of 
Academic Performance Screening may be justi-
fiable because academic results are presumably 
less important for production/frontline workers 
than work attitude and working experiences. 
Based on the estimates, treating work ethic as an 
essential criterion in hiring employees is associ-
ated with $1,520.57 increase of annual pay or 77 
percent of the average monthly salary of produc-
tion/frontline employees. When the two moni-
toring variables (Employee-Supervisor Ratio 
and teamwork) are further controlled, they are 
insignificant and hardly affect coefficients of 
the three screening variables. This is consistent 
with our theoretical arguments that screening 
for better workers is underlying the association 
between lower monitoring and higher wages.
Column 4 estimates the relationship between 
screening selectivity and the relative employee 
productivity compared to a firm’s major com-
petitors. While we understand the inherent 
weakness of a self-reported productivity mea-
sure, the coefficient of Work Attitude Screening 
is indeed positive and significant, which is at 
least consistent with our hypothesized relation-
ship. The estimated effects of the other three 
screening variables are also positive, but most 
are  insignificant. The results are similar if either 
Table 1—Screening Selectivity and Firm Outcomes
OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS
employee-supervisor ratio teamwork wages productivity turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Work attitude screening 1.77 5.84 0.06 0.19 −1.52
(0.70)**  (2.06)***  (0.03)** (0.11)* (0.79)*
Candidates# 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.02 −0.00
(0.08) (0.27) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
Work experience screening 1.05 3.40 0.04 0.10 −0.61
(1.23) (2.40)  (0.02)** (0.14) (0.97)
Academic performance  −0.31 −1.03 −0.02 0.63 0.31
 screening (0.52) (0.63) (0.01)*  (0.30)** (0.91)
Observations 1,960 2,020 1,930 1,974 989
R2 0.18 0.15 0.70 0.14 0.10
Notes: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. The data are from 1997 National Employer Survey (NES97) in the United 
States. The other control variables include the average schooling of production employees and their working hours per week, 
computer usage by supervisors and production employees, union representation, months to reach job proficiency for a typi-
cal new hire, the ratios of minority and women in the permanent employees, as well as five size dummies and 21 industry 
dummies.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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a probit or linear probability model is used. The 
estimates show that treating work attitude as 
an essential criterion is associated with 37 per-
cent of a standard deviation increase of Relative 
Productivity.
The relationship between the involuntary 
turnover rate of a firm’s employees and screen-
ing for work ethic is estimated in column 5. 
As expected, the coefficient of Work Attitude 
Screening is significant and negative, while 
those of the other screening variables are insig-
nificant. The estimates suggest that treating 
work attitude as essential in hiring employees 
is associated with a reduction of the involun-
tary turnover rate of 17 percent of a standard 
deviation.
IV.  Conclusions
We find that employers’ paying more atten-
tion to positive workplace attitudes in assessing 
job applicants, what we describe as work ethic, 
is related to less monitoring, greater use of 
teamwork, higher employee productivity, lower 
involuntary turnover rates, and higher wages for 
production or frontline workers. The underly-
ing intuition is that firms that are more selective 
in screening job candidates for work ethic are 
more likely to hire conscientious workers who 
are willing to work hard with less monitoring. 
These employers can then make use of practices 
like teamwork that involve workers more and 
monitor them less. Reduced monitoring costs 
create rents that the firm shares in the form of 
higher wages in order to attract and retain these 
good workers. Because employees with stronger 
work ethic are less likely to shirk, their produc-
tivity is higher relative to other firms and their 
involuntary turnover rates are lower. It is impor-
tant to note that these relations do not hold for 
the other types of screening. In future research, 
it would be interesting to examine the causality 
in these relationships as well as the factors that 
may cause them to vary, such as whether higher 
dismissal costs lead to greater screening of all 
kinds and how screening for different attributes 
might vary with labor market conditions. 
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